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Abstract
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present an analysis of advertising activities in a dynamic oligopoly model
with differentiated goods by differential game approach. There are many studies of dy-
namic oligopoly by differential game theory, for example, Cellini and Lambertini (2003a),
Cellini and Lambertini (2003b), Cellini and Lambertini (2004), Cellini and Lambertini (2005),
Cellini and Lambertini (2007), Cellini and Lambertini (2011), Fujiwara (2006), Fujiwara (2008),
and Lambertini (2018). Among them Cellini and Lambertini (2003b) analyzed the advertising
activities in a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated goods. However, most of these studies in-
cluding Cellini and Lambertini (2003b) used a model of linear demand functions and quadratic
or linear cost functions. These assumptions are very limited. We study the problem addressed
by them in an oligopoly under general demand and cost functions.
In the next section we present a model and assumptions. In Section 3 we consider the open-
loop solution of advertising activities. In Section 4 we present the memoryless closed-loop
solution of advertising activities. Cellini and Lambertini (2003b) claim that the open-loop
solution and the memoryless closed-loop solution coincide. Cellini and Lambertini (2003b)
said
the optimal values of the control variables of each player are not affected by state
variables different from its own market size.
However, it is incorrect. The market size (or the accumulated advertising effect) of one good
affects its price, then the demands of other goods are affected. We show that the comparison
of the open-loop solution and the closed-loop solution depends on whether the outputs of
the firms are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. If the outputs of the firms are
strategic substitutes, the steady state value of the accumulated effects of advertising in the
closed-loop solution is smaller than that in the open-loop solution. If the outputs of the firms
are strategic complements, the steady state value of the accumulated effects of advertising in
the closed-loop solution is larger than that in the open-loop solution. In Section 5 we analyze
the feedback solution using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, and show the equivalence of
the memoryless closed-loop solution and the feedback solutionwhen there is no spillover effect
of advertising activities. In Section 6 we consider advertising activities in a cartel. We show
that the adversing investment in the cartel may be larger than that in the open-loop solution.
This is due to the spillover of advertising activities.
2 The model
Consider an oligopolywith n firms in which at any t ∈ [0,∞) they produce differentiated goods
to maximize their discounted profits. The firms are called Firms 1, 2, . . . , n. Let qi(t) be
the output of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, pi(t) be the price at t. The inverse demand function is
written as
pi(t) = pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Ai(t) represents the market size of the good of Firm i, or the accumulated effects of advertising
for the good of Firm i. It is a state variable. Denote pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)) by pi. The
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inverse demand functions for all firms are symmetric. We assume
∂pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)
< 0,
∂pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂q j(t)
< 0, j , i,
∂pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂Ai(t)
> 0,
and
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
+
∂2pi
∂Ai(t)∂qi(t)
qi(t) > 0. (1)
If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
q j(t) < 0, j , i,
and if they are strategic complements
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
q j(t) > 0, j , i.
The production cost of Firm i is
c(qi(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, c(qi(t)) > 0.
This is common to all firms. c(qi(t)) is strictly increasing and convex, that is, c
′
i
(qi(t)) > 0 and
c′′
i
(qi(t)) ≥ 0.
Let ki(t) be the advertising investment by Firm i. The moving of Ai(t) is governed by
dAi(t)
dt
= Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) − δAi(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) > 0, (2)
where
K−i(t) =
∑
j,i
k j(t).
δ > 0 is the constant depreciation rate. We assume that Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) is strictly increasing
and concave, that is,
∂Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))
∂ki(t)
> 0,
∂Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))
∂K−i(t)
> 0,
∂2Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))
∂ki(t)2
≤ 0,
∂2Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))
∂ki(t)2
+ (n − 1)
∂2Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))
∂ki(t)∂K−i(t)
≤ 0,∂Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))∂ki(t)
 >
∂Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))∂ki(t)
 .
(3)
The last condition means that the direct effect of advertising is larger than the spillover effect.
Γ is common to all firms. Denote Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) by Γi.
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The advertising investment cost of Firm i is
γ(ki(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, γ(ki(t)) > 0.
We assume that it is strictly increasing and strictly convex, that is
γ′(ki(t)) > 0, γ
′′(ki(t)) > 0. (4)
γ is common to all firms.
The instantaneous profit of Firm i is written as
pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − c(qi(t)) − γ(ki(t)).
The objective of Firm i is
max
qi(t),ki (t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − c(qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))]dt,
subject to (2). ρ > 0 is the discount rate.
The present value Hamiltonian function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
Hi(qi(t), ki(t)) =e
−ρt
{
pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − c(qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))
+ λii(t)(Γi(ki(t),K−i(t)) − δAi(t)) +
∑
j,i
λi j(t)(Γj(k j(t),K− j (t)) − δA j (t))}.
The current value Hamiltonian function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
Hˆi(qi(t), ki(t)) =e
ρtHi = pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q2), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − c(qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))
+ λii(t)(Γi(ki(t),K−i(t)) − δAi(t)) +
∑
j,i
λi j(t)(Γj(k j(t),K− j (t)) − δA j (t)).
Let
µii(t) = e
−ρtλii(t), µi j(t) = e
−ρtλi j(t).
µii(t) and µi j(t) are the costate variables. Denote Hˆi(qi(t), ki(t)) by Hˆi.
3 Advertising in dynamic oligopoly: Open-loop solution
We seek to the solution of the open-loop approach.
The first order conditions for Firm i are
∂Hˆi
∂qi(t)
= pi +
∂pi
∂qi(t)
qi(t) − c
′(qi(t)) = 0, (5)
and
∂Hˆi
∂ki(t)
= −γ′(ki(t)) + λii(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+
∑
j,i
λi j(t)
∂Γj
∂K− j(t)
= 0. (6)
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The second order condition about production is
∂Hˆ2
i
∂qi(t)2
= 2
∂pi
∂qi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)2
qi(t) − c
′′(qi(t)) < 0.
The second order condition about advertising investment is
∂2Hˆi
∂ki(t)2
= −γ′′(ki(t)) + λii(t)
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
+
∑
j,i
λi j(t)
∂2Γj
∂K− j(t)2
< 0, j , i.
The adjoint conditions are
−
∂Hˆi
∂Ai(t)
=
∂λii(t)
∂t
− ρλii(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (7)
and
−
∂Hˆi
∂A j (t)
=
∂λi j(t)
∂t
− ρλi j(t), j , i. (8)
We have
∂Hˆi
∂Ai(t)
=
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t) − δλii(t), (9)
and
∂Hˆi
∂A j(t)
= −δλi j (t), j , i. (10)
At the steady state
dAi(t)
dt
= Γi − δAi(t) = 0, (11)
∂λii(t)
∂t
= 0,
∂λi j(t)
∂t
= 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j , i.
By symmetry of the oligopoly we can assume λii(t) = λ j j(t), λi j(t) = λ jl(t) = λ ji(t), j , i, l ,
i, j, ki(t) = k j(t), qi(t) = q j(t), Ai(t) = A j(t) for j , i, and so on. Denote the steady state
values of qi(t), ki(t), Ai(t), λii(t) and λi j(t) by q
∗, k∗,A∗, λown and λother .
From (8) and (10) we have
λother = 0.
From (7) and (9)
(ρ + δ)λown =
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
q∗.
(6) is reduced to
−γ′(k∗) + λown
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0.
Therefore, we get
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
q∗ − (ρ + δ)
γ′(k∗)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0. (12)
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From (2) and (7), under the symmetry condition,
dAi(t)
dt
= Γ(ki(t), (n − 1)ki(t)) − δAi(t), (13)
and
∂λii(t)
∂t
= −
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t) + (ρ + δ)λii(t). (14)
From (6) with λi j(t) = 0 and λii(t) =
γ′(ki (t))
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
, under the symmetry condition,
∂ki(t)
∂λii(t)
=
(
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
)2
γ′′
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
− γ′
[
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
+ (n − 1)
∂2Γi
∂ki (t)∂K−i(t)
] .
Thus, we have
∂Γ(ki(t), (n − 1)ki(t))
∂λii(t)
=
(
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
) ( ∂Γi
∂ki(t)
)2
γ′′
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
− γ′
[
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
+ (n − 1)
∂2Γi
∂ki (t)∂K−i(t)
] .
Consider a system of dynamic equations (13) and (14). Linearization of them around the
steady state is as follows. [
dAi(t)
dt
∂λii(t)
∂t
]
= Ω
[
Ai(t) − A
∗
λii(t) − λ
∗
]
,
Ω =

−δ
(
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
) ( ∂Γi
∂ki (t)
)2
γ′′
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
−γ′
[
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)
2 +(n−1)
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)∂K−i (t)
]
− ∂
∂Ai(t)
(
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t)
)
ρ + δ

.
The Jacobian matrix Ω has the following trace and determinant
tr (Ω) = ρ > 0,
detΩ
=
(
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
) ( ∂Γi
∂ki(t)
)2
γ′′
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
− γ′
[
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
+ (n − 1)
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)∂K−i(t)
] ∂
∂Ai(t)
(
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t)
)
− δ(ρ + δ).
For the steady state to be a saddle point we need
detΩ < 0.
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If detΩ > 0, the steady state is unstable. From
dAi(t)
dt
= 0, we have
Γ(k∗, (n − 1)k∗) = δA∗ .
Thus,
dk∗
dA∗
=
δ
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1) ∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
.
Let Φ be the left-hand side of (12). Differentiating Φ with respect to Ai(t) at the steady state
yields
∂Φ
∂Ai(t)
=
∂
∂Ai(t)
(
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
q∗
)
− (ρ + δ)
∂
∂ki(t)
(
γ′(k∗)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
)
δ
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1) ∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
=
∂
∂Ai(t)
(
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
q∗
)
− δ(ρ + δ)
γ′′
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
− γ′
[
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
+ (n − 1) ∂
2
Γi
∂ki(t)∂K−i(t)
]
(
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
)2 [
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1) ∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
] .
From the assumptions (3) and (4)
γ′′
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
− γ′
[
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
+ (n − 1)
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)∂K−i(t)
]
> 0.
Therefore, detΩ < 0 means ∂Φ
∂Ai(t)
< 0, and we have shown the following result.
Lemma 1. The left-hand side of (12), Φ, is decreasing with respect to Ai(t).
Linear and quadratic example
Assume that the inverse demand function is
pi(t) = Ai(t) − Bqi(t) − D
∑
j,i
q j(t).
The advertising cost is
γ(ki(t)) =
α
2
(ki(t))
2.
The production cost is
c(qi(t)) = cqi(t),
and the accumulation of advertising effects is written as
Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) = ki(t) + β
∑
j,i
k j(t), 0 < β < 1.
At the steady state, (5) is reduced to
A∗ − [B + D(n − 1)]q∗ − Bq∗ − c = 0.
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Thus,
q∗ =
A∗ − c
2B + D(n − 1)
.
(12) is reduced to
q∗ = (ρ + δ)αk∗ .
Thus,
A∗ − c
2B + D(n − 1)
= (ρ + δ)αk∗ . (15)
From (11)
A∗ =
Γi
δ
=
[1 + (n − 1)β]k∗
δ
. (16)
Solving (15) and (16) yields
A∗ =
[1 + (n − 1)β]c
1 + (n − 1)β − αδ(ρ + δ)[2B + (n − 1)D]
,
and
k∗ =
cδ
1 + (n − 1)β − αδ(ρ + δ)[2B + (n − 1)D]
.
These are the results in Cellini and Lambertini (2003b).
4 Advertising in a dynamic oligopoly: Memoryless
closed-loop solution without spillover
We seek to the solution of the memoryless closed-loop approach. As discussed in Introduction
memoryless closed-loop and open-loop are not equivalent. For simplicity, we assume
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
= 0, (17)
that is, there is no spillover effect of advertising investment. The first order conditions and the
second order conditions for Firm i are the same as those in the open-loop case. Using (17),
they are
∂Hˆi
∂qi(t)
= pi +
∂pi
∂qi(t)
qi(t) − c
′(qi(t)) = 0, (18)
∂Hˆi
∂ki(t)
= −γ′(ki(t)) + λii(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0, (19)
∂Hˆ2
i
∂qi(t)2
= 2
∂pi
∂qi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)2
qi(t) − c
′′(qi(t)) < 0,
and
∂2Hˆi
∂ki(t)2
= −γ′′(ki(t)) + λii(t)
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
< 0, j , i.
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The adjoint conditions are different from those in the open-loop case. They are
−
∂Hˆi
∂Ai(t)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
∂k j(t)
∂Ai(t)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
(20)
=
∂λii(t)
∂t
− ρλii(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
and
−
∂Hˆi
∂A j (t)
−
∑
l,i, j
∂Hˆi
∂kl(t)
∂kl(t)
∂A j(t)
−
∂Hˆi
∂k j (t)
∂k j(t)
∂A j(t)
(21)
−
∑
l,i, j
∂Hˆi
∂ql(t)
∂ql(t)
∂A j (t)
−
∂Hˆi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂A j(t)
=
∂λi j(t)
∂t
− ρλi j(t), j , i.
The terms in (20)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
∂k j(t)
∂Ai(t)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
,
and the terms in (21)
−
∑
l,i, j
∂Hˆi
∂kl(t)
∂kl(t)
∂A j(t)
−
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
∂k j(t)
∂A j(t)
−
∑
l,i, j
∂Hˆi
∂ql(t)
∂ql(t)
∂A j (t)
−
∂Hˆi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂A j(t)
take into account the interaction between the control variables of the firms other than Firm i
and the current levels of the state variables.
We have
∂Hˆi
∂Ai(t)
=
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t) − δλii(t), (22)
∂Hˆi
∂A j(t)
= −δλi j(t), j , i,
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
= −λi j(t)
∂Γj
∂k j(t)
, j , i,
∂Hˆi
∂q j(t)
=
∂pi
∂q j(t)
qi(t), j , i, (23)
and
∂k j(t)
∂Ai(t)
= 0, j , i.
∂qj(t)
∂Ai(t)
is obtained by (43) in Appendix. If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes(
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t) < 0
)
,
∂qj(t)
∂Ai(t)
> 0, and if they are strategic complements
(
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t) > 0
)
,
∂qj(t)
∂Ai(t)
> 0.
9
At the steady state we have
dAi(t)
dt
= Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) − δAi(t) = 0,
and
∂λii
∂t
= 0,
∂λi j
∂t
= 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j , i.
By symmetry of the oligopoly we can assume λii(t) = λ j j(t) for j , i, λi j(t) = λil(t) = λ ji(t)
for j, l , i,
∂k j (t)
∂Ai(t)
=
∂kl(t)
∂Aj(t)
for l , j, Ai(t) = A j(t), k j(t) = ki(t), q j(t) = qi(t) for j , i, and so
on. Denote the steady state values of λii, λi j , Ai(t), qi(t) and ki(t) by λown, λother , A
∗∗, q∗∗ and
k∗∗. Then, with (22) and (23), (20) is rewritten as
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
q∗ + (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
q∗
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
= (ρ + δ)λown. (24)
The first order condition for the choice of ki(t), (19), is reduced to
−γ′(k∗∗) + λown
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0.
From (24) this means[
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
]
q∗ − (ρ + δ)
γ′(k∗∗)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0. (25)
From (2) and (20 with (22), (23)) we obtain
dAi(t)
dt
= Γ(ki(t), (n − 1)ki(t)) − δAi(t), (26)
and
∂λii(t)
∂t
= −
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t) − (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
qi(t) + (ρ + δ)λii(t). (27)
Under the assumption
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
= 0, for the steady state to be a saddle point we need
detΩ′ < 0,
where
Ω
′
=

−δ
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
(
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
)2
γ′′
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
−γ′
∂2Γi
∂ki (t)
2
− ∂
∂Ai(t)
[
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t) + (n − 1)
∂pi
∂qj(t)
∂qj(t)
∂Ai(t)
qi(t)
]
ρ + δ

.
We assume detΩ′ < 0. This system of dynamics are obtained from (26) and (27).
The first order condition for the output choice in the memoryless closed-loop case, (18), is
the same as that, (5), in the open-loop case. Thus, we have q∗∗ = q∗ given the value of Ai(t).
We show the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. Assume that there is no spillover effect of advertising investment.
1. If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes, the steady state value of Ai(t) in the
closed-loop solution is larger than that in the open-loop solution.
2. If the outputs of the firms are strategic complements, the steady state value of Ai(t) in
the closed-loop solution is smaller than that in the open-loop solution.
Proof. 1. Let us compare (25) with (12) in the open-loop case. Suppose that A∗ = A∗∗.
Then, q∗ = q∗∗, k∗ = k∗∗. They satisfy (25), and the left-hand side of (12), which is
denoted by Φ, is negative because
∂pi
∂qj(t)
< 0 and
∂qj(t)
∂Ai(t)
< 0. Since Φ is decreasing
with respect to Ai(t), the steady state value of Ai(t) in the open-loop solution is smaller
than that in the closed-loop solution, or the steady state value of Ai(t) in the closed-loop
solution is larger than that in the open-loop solution.
2. If the outputs of the firms are strategic complements,
∂qj(t)
∂Ai(t)
< 0, and the left-hand side
of (12) is positive. Therefore, the steady state value of Ai(t) in the closed-loop solution
is smaller than that in the open-loop solution.
 
5 Advertising in a dynamic oligopoly: Feedback solution
without spillover
We consider a solution of feedback approach using the HJB equation. Similarly to the previous
section we assume
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
= 0.
Let Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t)) be the value function of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The HJB
equation for Firm i is written as
ρVi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t)) = max
qi(t),ki (t)
{piqi(t) − c(qi(t)) − γi(ki(t)) (28)
+
∂Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t)
∂Ai(t)
(Γi − δAi(t)) +
∑
j,i
∂Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t)
∂A j (t)
(Γj − δAi(t))}.
The first order conditions are
pi +
∂pi
∂qi(t)
qi(t) − c
′(qi(t)) = 0, (29)
and
− γ′(ki(t)) +
∂Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t))
∂Ai(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0. (30)
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(29) is the same as (18) in the memoryless closed-loop case. From (30)
∂Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t))
∂Ai(t)
=
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
. (31)
Substituting this into (28), using symmetry, yields
ρVi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t)) = piqi(t) − c(qi(t)) − γi(ki(t))
+
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
[Γi − δAi(t)] + (n − 1)
∂Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t)
∂A j(t)
[Γj − δA j(t)], j , i.
This is an identity. Differentiating it with respect to Ai(t) yields
ρ
∂Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t))
∂Ai(t)
=
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t) +
[
pi +
∂pi
∂qi(t)
qi(t) − c
′(qi(t))
]
∂qi(t)
∂Ai(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
qi(t)
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
−
∂
∂ki(t)
(
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
)
∂ki(t)
∂Ai(t)
(Γi − δAi(t)) − δ
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
+ (n − 1)
∂2Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t)
∂Ai(t)∂A j(t)
(Γj − δA j(t))).
At the steady state Γi − δAi(t) = Γj − δA j(t) = 0. Thus, using (29), we get
ρ
∂Vi(A1(t), A2(t), . . . , An(t))
∂Ai(t)
=
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
qi(t) + (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
qi(t)
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
− δ
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
.
From this and (31),[
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
]
qi(t) − (ρ + δ)
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0.
This is the same as (25). Therefore,
Proposition 2. If there is no spillover effect of the advertising investment, the memoryless
closed-loop solution and the feedback solution are equivalent.
6 Cartel
We consider full cartelization in which the firms cooperatively determine their outputs and
advertising investments to maximize the discounted total profits. By symmetry we assume
pi(t) = p j(t), qi(t) = q j(t)), ki(t) = k j(t), Ai(t) = A j(t) for any j , i. Denote the values of
them by p(t), q(t), k(t), A(t). The objective of the firms is
max
q(t),k(t)
n
∫ ∞
0
n[p(A(t), q(t), . . . , q(t))q(t) − c(q(t)) − γ(k(t))]dt .
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subject to
dA(t)
dt
= Γ(k(t), (n − 1)k(t)) − δA(t).
Let Hˆ be the current value Hamiltonian function, then
Hˆ =n {p(A(t), q(t), . . . , q(t))q(t) − c(q(t)) − γ(k(t))} (32)
+ λ(t) [Γ(k(t), (n − 1)k(t)) − δA(t)] .
Let
µ(t) = e−ρtλ(t).
µ(t) is the costate variable. Denote p(A(t), q(t), . . . , q(t)) by p. The first order conditions are
∂Hˆ
∂q(t)
= n
{
p +
[
∂pi
∂qi(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
]
q(t) − c′(q(t))
}
= 0, (33)
and
∂Hˆ
∂k(t)
= −nγ′ + λ(t)
[
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
]
= 0. (34)
The adjoint condition is
−
∂Hˆ
∂A(t)
= −n
∂pi
∂A(t)
qi(t) + δλ(t) =
∂λ(t)
∂t
− ρλ(t). (35)
At the steady state
dA(t)
dt
= Γ(k(t), (n − 1)k(t)) − δA(t) = 0,
∂λ(t)
∂t
= 0.
Denote the steady state values of A(t), λ(t), q(t) and k(t) by Ac, λc, qc and kc. From (35)
n
∂pi
∂A(t)
qc − λc(ρ + δ) = 0.
Then, from (34) we have
∂pi
∂A(t)
qc
[
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
]
− (ρ + δ) γ′ = 0. (36)
We show the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If there is no spillover effect, the value of A(t) in the cartel is smaller than the
value of Ai(t) in the open-loop solution.
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Proof. 1. Compare (33) and the first order condition in the open-loop case (5). If qi(t)
satisfies (33), the left-hand side of (5) is
−(n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
qi(t) > 0.
Therefore, under the second order condition for the output choice in the open-loop case,
the output of each firm in the open-loop solution is larger than that in the cartel, or the
output of each firm in the cartel is smaller than that in the open-loop solution, that is,
qc < q∗ given A(t) .
2. Assume
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
= 0. Then, (36) is reduced to
∂pi
∂A(t)
qc − (ρ + δ)
γ′
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0. (37)
Suppose that A(t) and qc, which is obtained from (33) with A(t), satisfy (37). Then, the
left-hand side of (12) in the open-loop case, which is denoted by Φ, is negative because
by (1)
∂pi
∂A(t)
qi(t) is deceasing with respect to qi(t) and q
∗ > qc. Since Φ is decreasing
with respect to Ai(t), the value of Ai(t) in the open-loop solution is larger than the value
of A(t) in the cartel, or the value of A(t) in the cartel is smaller than the value of Ai(t) in
the open-loop solution. 

If there is spillover effect of advertising activities, the value of A(t) in the cartel may be
larger than Ai(t) in the open-loop solution.
Linear and quadratic example
Assume that the inverse demand function is
pi(t) = Ai(t) − Bqi(t) − D
∑
j,i
q j(t).
The advertising cost is
γ(ki(t)) =
α
2
(ki(t))
2.
The production cost is
c(qi(t)) = cqi(t),
and the accumulation of advertising effects is written as
Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) = ki(t) + β
∑
j,i
k j(t).
At the steady state (33) and (34) are reduced to
A − [B + D(n − 1)]q − [B + (n − 1)D]q − cq = 0, (38)
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and
− αnk + λ[1 + (n − 1)β] = 0. (39)
From (35) with
∂λ(t)
∂t
= 0,
(ρ + δ)λ = nq. (40)
From (38)
q =
A − c
2[B + (n − 1)D]
. (41)
From
dA(t)
dt
= k + (n − 1)βk − δA = 0,
k =
δA
1 + (n − 1)β
. (42)
Solving (39), (40), (41) and (42),
A =
[1 + (n − 1)β]2c
(1 + (n − 1)β)2 − 2αδ(ρ + δ)(B + (n − 1)D)
,
k =
[1 + (n − 1)β]cδ
(1 + (n − 1)β)2 − 2αδ(ρ + δ)(B + (n − 1)D)
.
In Cellini and Lambertini (2003b) the current value Hamiltonian function in (32) is written
as follows.
Hˆ = n {p(A(t), q(t), . . . , q(t))q(t) − c(q(t)) − γ(k(t)) + λ(t) [Γ(k(t), (n − 1)k(t)) − δA(t)]} .
Then, we obtain
A =
[1 + (n − 1)β]2nc
n[1 + (n − 1)β]2 − 2αδ(ρ + nδ)[B + (n − 1)D]
,
k =
[1 + (n − 1)β]ncδ
n[1 + (n − 1)β]2 − 2αδ(ρ + nδ)[B + (n − 1)D]
.
These are the results in Cellini and Lambertini (2003b).
7 Concluding Remark
We have studied the problem of advertising activities in a dynamic oligopoly under general
demand and cost functions by a differential game approach. We have shown that the results
in Cellini and Lambertini (2003b) in a case of linear demand and quadratic cost functions can
be generalized to a case of general demand and cost functions, but some results depend on the
property of demand functions, strategic substitutability or strategic complementartity.
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Appendix: Derivation of
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
.
Suppose a state such that q1(t) = q2(t) = · · · = qn(t). Denote pi(Ai(t), q1(t), q1(t), . . . , qn(t))
by pi. The first order conditions for Firm i and Firm j, j , i, are
pi +
∂pi
∂qi(t)
qi(t) − c
′(qi(t)) = 0,
and
p j +
∂p j
∂q j(t)
q j(t) − c
′(q j(t)) = 0,
Differentiating them with respect to Ai(t) yields[
2
∂pi
∂qi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)2
qi(t) − c
′′(qi(t))
]
∂qi(t)
∂Ai(t)
+ (n − 1)
[
∂pi
∂q j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
qi(t)
]
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
= −
[
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)∂Ai(t)
qi(t)
]
,
and[
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
q j(t)
]
∂qi(t)
∂Ai(t)
+
[
n
∂p j
∂q j(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂2p j
∂q j(t)2
q j(t) − c
′′(q j(t))
]
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
= 0.
Let
Ψ = −
[
∂pi
∂Ai(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)∂Ai(t)
qi(t)
]
< 0.
From them we obtain
∂qi(t)
∂Ai(t)
=
n
∂p j
∂qj(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂2p j
∂qj(t)2
q j(t) − c
′′(q j(t))
∆
Ψ > 0,
and
∂q j(t)
∂Ai(t)
= −
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj(t)
q j(t)
∆
Ψ, (43)
where
∆ =
[
2
∂pi
∂qi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)2
qi(t) − c
′′(qi(t))
] [
n
∂p j
∂q j(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂2p j
∂q j(t)2
q j(t) − c
′′(q j(t))
]
− (n − 1)
[
∂pi
∂q j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
qi(t)
] [
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
q j(t)
]
> 0.
If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes
(
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t) < 0
)
,
∂qj(t)
∂Ai(t)
< 0, and
if they are strategic complements
(
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t) > 0
)
,
∂qj(t)
∂Ai(t)
> 0.
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